By Dylan Moon and Chris Keefer
October 2, 2025
Canada is doubling down on another resource partnership with Germany – this time for critical minerals – despite the costly lessons of its last economic gamble.
In late August, the Canadian and German governments met in Berlin to sign a new joint declaration of intent to co-operate on critical mineral supplies. Unfortunately, a previous agreement, the 2022 “Canada Germany Hydrogen Alliance” (Natural Resources Canada 2025) delivered little more than risk and rhetoric.
Signed with fanfare and pitched as a win-win for both nations, the green hydrogen deal exposed Canadians to major risks with little return. Any serious analysis of this new Canada-Germany mineral pact must begin with a clear-eyed reckoning of past failures.
With the formation of the Canada-Germany Hydrogen Alliance, Canada began to play a game it had already lost. The Canadian government has since pledged hundreds of millions of dollars directly or indirectly to green hydrogen export projects through political mechanisms that avoid ordinary due diligence, and it has made available billions more through a Clean Hydrogen Investment Tax Credit (ITC) of up to 40 per cent of the cost of eligible equipment. Not only do these subsidies rest on shaky economic and policy foundations, but they failed the very goal set out in the joint declaration: to begin deliveries by 2025.
Unfortunately, these projects cannot compete on economic grounds with regional European suppliers whose use of pipelines can avoid the wasteful chemical conversions needed to ship hydrogen across the ocean. These and other inefficiencies raise costs for Canada, even as a developing global market for hydrogen drives prices down. Continuing down its path of unquestioning support for green hydrogen exports, Canada has fallen victim to several fallacies and oversights that threaten to lock the country into high-cost, low-value-added exports without a defensible strategic position. Furthermore, by undercounting hydrogen export-related emissions for the Hydrogen ITC using its “cradle-to-gate” methodology, even the federal government’s climate rationale for these projects and their subsidies falls short.
In his August remarks in Berlin, Energy and Natural Resources Minister Tim Hodgson stood behind the Canada-Germany Hydrogen Alliance. But there are hints that enthusiasm is waning. Hodgson mentioned Canada’s LNG and natural gas nearly twice as many times as he did hydrogen (Natural Resources Canada 2025). Hydrogen exports no longer enjoy the “transatlantic energy security” spotlight. If the Government of Canada is wise, it will, once and for all, pivot away from its subsidy support for hydrogen export projects.
The “natural resource” fallacy
Canada has a legacy as a natural resource superpower. Its wealth of mineral and other deposits gave it a fortunate cost advantage on hard-to-find, in-demand materials that made its natural resources profitable. Since 2022, Canada has chased similar success in green hydrogen exports. After signing the joint declaration of intent to establish a Canada-Germany Hydrogen Alliance, former Prime Minister Justin Trudeau said: “We must look to resources like hydrogen, which can and will be clean and renewable. We can be the reliable supplier of clean energy a net-zero world needs” (Moore 2022).
Hydrogen hype comes from its zero-emission properties. During combustion or use in a fuel cell, hydrogen releases usable energy. But whereas fossil fuels make carbon dioxide and other pollutants when they burn, hydrogen makes only water. Hydrogen gas is already widely used in industrial processes, but producers typically make it with natural gas, undoing its climate benefits. Moreover, hydrogen’s chemistry and small molecular size make it difficult to transport and store. If engineers can overcome these challenges of making, moving, and storing it, “green” hydrogen – made without fossil fuels – could become a widespread substitute for oil and natural gas. If Canada can produce large amounts of green hydrogen, then at first glance, exporting this hydrogen would seem to continue Canada’s natural resource legacy in a new era of clean fuels.
Here begins the first fallacy. Unlike Canada’s abundant uranium, iron, oil, and potash, hydrogen is not a natural resource with which Canada, or any country, is geographically blessed. It must be manufactured with facilities built from the ground up. In the case of green hydrogen, this involves using relatively immature electrolysis technology and vast quantities of electricity. Canada is endowed with wind energy on its Atlantic coast, but we must ask if investing in the technology to capture that energy is worth the goal of hydrogen exports.
Hydrogen, like the above natural resources, is a low-value-added, bulk commodity. Unlike these commodities, however, hydrogen cannot be retrieved from the ground, easily transported, or cheaply stored. Green hydrogen poses all the hassles of a sophisticated, value-added product without its profitability or defensible market position. It is, moreover, a product in which Canada has no special advantage over other potential producers. Indeed, given Canada’s distance from the European market, it faces severe disadvantages.
Consider also the size and durability of the market. The number of customers willing to pay the cost-premium for green hydrogen compared to ordinary hydrogen and ammonia, let alone the cheap fossil fuels it aims to replace, is vanishingly small in comparison to the global markets for uranium, iron, and Canada’s other natural resources. Germany itself has shown hesitation, further increasing the odds that an oversupply of hydrogen will collide with absent demand. In its 2025 budget, the new German government reduced available medium-term funds for executing the country’s hydrogen strategy from EUR 3.75 billion to EUR 1.28 billion (Argus 2025).
Hydrogen exports, then, represent the precise inversion of a desirable economic position. Rather than control a limited supply of essential goods with a nearly unlimited market, Canada is trying to compete with a theoretically unrestricted global supply of hydrogen for a share of a fringe market supported by the discretionary climate policies of wealthy governments.
Amid these conditions, Canada’s efforts to prop up a new green hydrogen export industry from scratch will bring little but remorse to Canadian taxpayers. Even if the currently proposed projects achieve commercial operation, they will leave Canada in the unenviable position of a high-cost bulk commodity exporter.
Yet Canada has not wavered in its support for these projects. It has made available several hundred million dollars in loans to hydrogen export projects through the Clean Fuels Fund, Strategic Innovation Fund, Canada Growth Fund, and initiatives from Export Development Canada and the Canada Infrastructure Bank (Natural Resources Canada 2024b). In 2024, the federal government signed into law a Clean Hydrogen Investment Tax Credit of up to 40 per cent on the capital cost of these projects. Later that year, Canada committed $300 million to Germany’s H2Global auction mechanism to match buyers and sellers of green ammonia.
Given the structural issues surrounding hydrogen exports, it’s already clear that these projects post risks to Canadian taxpayers – even without considering the technical shortcomings. Still, it’s worth examining them in more detail.
Energy losses
Not only does Canada have no special advantage in hydrogen exports, but its distance from the European market poses a marked disadvantage. Hydrogen projects in Atlantic Canada cannot export molecular hydrogen directly to Europe and must convert it first to easier-to-ship ammonia. Stacking the processes of electrolysis to produce the initial hydrogen, its inefficient conversion into ammonia, its shipping across the Atlantic, and its “cracking” to retrieve the hydrogen from the ammonia, the delivered hydrogen will contain less than half of the energy content it took to get it to German ports (Canadians for Nuclear Energy 2024).
These inefficiencies mean that, all else being equal, for every 1 kg of hydrogen delivered from Canada, a European producer avoiding the ammonia round-trip could produce 1.5 kg for the same amount of energy. In economic terms, Canada must pay this 50 per cent “inefficiency tax” just to compete with producers closer to Germany.
Economic delusions
Hydrogen already has wide industrial usage in petroleum refining and ammonia production. Ammonia, for its part, is responsible for much of the world’s fertilizer and is used in a range of other industrial processes. This existing market provides free insight into the economics of hydrogen and the readiness of clean hydrogen technology.
Two facts become clear. First, virtually all of the world’s hydrogen is produced on-site where it is used, owing to the impracticality of transport. Second, only 0.1 per cent of hydrogen production comes from electrolysis, owing to economics and the low technological readiness of electrolysers (International Energy Agency 2023). The vast majority of hydrogen comes from natural gas without carbon capture, from coal, or as the byproduct of other industrial processes.
The proposed Canadian projects, by exporting hydrogen made with electricity, position themselves at the exact intersection of these two disadvantaging forces, each of which has held back global market shares to negligible proportions.
The headwinds against Canadian hydrogen intensify when considering Germany’s EUR 18.9 billion investment in its “hydrogen core network,” a system of over 9,000 kilometres of hydrogen pipelines that will allow direct imports from broader Europe without the ammonia round-trip (BMWK-FMEACA 2024). These imports are expected to be available from the 40 gigawatts of electrolysers that the European Commission has urged to be built by 2030 (European Union 2020).
Germany has also advanced specific agreements for pipeline-imported green hydrogen with countries like France and Denmark, which in early 2025 announced over US$2 billion in subsidies for a hydrogen pipelines to Germany (Danish Ministry of Climate, Energy and Utilities 2022; Collins 2025).
Denmark, for its part, is building the world’s largest Solid Oxide Electrolysis (SOEC) manufacturing facility. This form of electrolysis can achieve efficiencies 20 to 30 per cent better than the Proton Exchange Membrane Electrolysis (PEMEC) planned for use in Canada’s hydrogen export projects (Topsoe 2025b and 2025b). We have already established that the ammonia round-trip imposes a 50 per cent inefficiency tax on Canadian hydrogen exports. Considering that Canada would lock in PEMEC while Europe advances with pipeline-connected SOEC, Canada could end up requiring 60 to 80 per cent more energy per tonne of delivered hydrogen than regional producers.
In physical terms, this means that if a pipeline-connected SOEC facility in Europe were, for example, powered by 3 gigawatts of wind turbines (roughly the proposed size of Canada’s World Energy GH2 project), Canada would need to equip a PEMEC hydrogen-ammonia export facility (with similar electrolysis capacity) with as much as 5.4 gigawatts of wind turbines just to match its deliveries. To pay this 2.4 gigawatt penalty for this single hypothetical project, at the average 2022 cost of Canadian wind projects of $1,775 per kilowatt, would take around $4.2 billion (Kilpatrick, Lafreniere, and Cacereset 2022).
Uncounted emissions
Economics are not the only trouble. The energy losses and additional energy inputs associated with clean hydrogen exports have the added impact of raising their environmental cost. These export-related emissions go uncounted in the “cradle-to-gate” methodology used to award the Clean Hydrogen Investment Tax Credits (Fowler et al. 2023). These uncounted emissions come in part from the 600 tonnes of marine fuel that would be burned every round trip to deliver ammonia from Canada to Germany by large gas carriers, accounting for over 20,000 tonnes of carbon emissions (Canadians for Nuclear Energy 2024). Further emissions come from the energy-intensive ammonia cracking required to retrieve the hydrogen upon delivery.
According to analysis by Canadians for Nuclear Energy, these unavoidable processes, when properly accounted for, would drive the carbon intensity of Canadian hydrogen export projects from the 40 per cent ITC tier to, at most, the 15 per cent ITC tier of 2 to 4 kg of CO2 per kg of H2 (Canadians for Nuclear Energy 2024). This puts the emissions-saving rationale for hydrogen exports on shaky ground.
Public money, private gain
As Canada prepares to disburse billions of dollars in questionable subsidies to these projects, it is worth noting the companies and individuals that stand to receive them. Among the list of developers and their subcontractors, a Canadian company can hardly be found.
TDL Partners (parent company to EverWind Fuels), Pattern Energy, Cross River Infrastructure Partners LLC, BAES Infrastructure, and Buckeye Partners all hail from the United States. ABO Wind, developing a project in Newfoundland and Labrador, is German. Contractors for electrolysis, backup generators, and ammonia conversion facilities are based in the United States, Germany, South Korea, and Denmark. Local labour requirements for the Hydrogen ITC appear not to extend to the project owners and contractors themselves.
Moreover, the government loans and subsidies available to these companies reveal concerning financial imprudence. In 2024, former federal Labour Minister Seamus O’Regan announced a $128 million loan for World Energy GH2, developer of green hydrogen facility Project Nujio’qonik. His reason was that “the markets are going in that way, and the money is going that way.” This contrasts sharply with World Energy GH2’s later admission that it is having trouble developing a hydrogen market, as well as the fact that Canadian hydrogen export projects are being sustained almost purely by public money (Moore 2024; Globe and Mail 2024). O’Regan added, “We are here today because World Energy GH2 is in a hurry. We need to get this project off the ground and signal to the world we are in the green hydrogen game now.”
If this sounds like an imprudent justification for a loan of over $100 million, that’s because it is. This loan, and a similar one to EverWind Fuels, came from Export Development Canada’s (EDC) special political-override account, the “Canada Account.” This special account is reserved for deals that are too high-risk for EDC to support but that have been “determined by the Minister for International Trade to be in Canada’s national interest”(Export Canada Export Development Canada 2025. ).
Canada Account loans expose taxpayers to far greater liability than they may realize, both because they are high risk and because they have a history of being “quietly written off,” as in the case of the $2.6 billion write-off for a 2009 loan to Chrysler (Beeby 2018). These loans are driven by political expediency rather than fiscal prudence. Indeed, being relegated to the Canada Account, they are by definition investments that EDC would not otherwise make.
Having bypassed requirements for sound commercial evaluation, these loans should not be taken to indicate investor confidence. In a real sense, they should indicate the opposite.
The financial irresponsibility of hydrogen subsidies does not stop there. The Hydrogen ITC is based purely on achieving technical criteria, potentially disbursing tens of billions of dollars in tax credits to developers without any requirement of a viable business case. On the back-end, these developers will be further subsidized by the $300 million pledge and any future money Canada commits to the H2Global auction mechanism (Natural Resources Canada 2024a). No requirements for eventual standalone financial sustainability have been indicated.
These projects are awash in subsidies before, during, and after their construction, without any apparent requirement for them to make economic sense.
No first-mover advantage
Minister O’Regan was not alone in his enthusiasm to enter the hydrogen export market early. The 2022 Joint Declaration, signed by former Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, aimed to put Canada ahead of the pack in the green hydrogen trade (Natural Resources Canada 2022). The Declaration stated, “The Participants aim to closely collaborate on all aspects necessary to kickstart the hydrogen economy and to create a transatlantic supply chain for hydrogen well before 2030….” By moving first and partnering with Germany, perhaps Canada could gain some advantage.
Three years later, it hasn’t succeeded in moving first. The first contract to emerge from Germany’s H2Global auction to secure green hydrogen imports didn’t go to a Canadian company, despite the supposed existence of a Canada-Germany Hydrogen Alliance, but to Fertiglobe, an Egyptian subsidiary of the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (Ammonia Energy Association 2024).
If this discourages Canadian developers, it may be for the better. It is backward thinking to expect a first-mover advantage from building capital-intensive projects with decreasing future revenues as green ammonia becomes cheaper. The first-mover locks in expensive, less-efficient technology that will not produce at the price points of future iterations of the technology and yet will need to compete in the same commodity market for the next 30 years.
Developers of Canadian projects themselves are showing second thoughts. World Energy GH2 announced a pivot toward providing power for data centres, saying that the “green ammonia market is taking longer to develop than expected” (Globe and Mail 2024). The company’s Project Nujio’qonik had been the farthest along and one of the most ambitious of the Atlantic Canada hydrogen export projects.
An unequal “alliance”
Canada’s investment in hydrogen exports is not just high-risk, low-reward – there is also a severe risk imbalance between the two members of the so-called Canada-Germany Hydrogen Alliance.
How is it possible that, with such an alliance, Canada’s proposed hydrogen projects have been largely unable to find German buyers? In a strategic partnership, countries often forgo aspects of traditional competitive procurement in favour of advancing mutual interests. Despite the “alliance” and “partnership” verbiage, a strategic partnership is not at all what Germany has in mind.
Germany is aiming to develop a global, competitive market from which to procure green hydrogen supplies. The Canada-Germany Hydrogen Alliance is simply not unique. Germany has made similar “alliances” with Australia, Egypt, Denmark, France, and elsewhere (German-Australian Chamber of Industry and Commerce, n.d.; German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, n.d.; State of Green 2025; Futurium 2025). Once these countries pour billions of dollars into dubious hydrogen export projects, Germany will be in the position of picking and choosing from whom, if anyone, it wants to buy.
If Canadian projects remain uncompetitive compared to other sellers, as will likely be the case, Canada will be stuck with billions of dollars in uneconomic assets, having been led on by the once-alluring hope of finding a German buyer.
Foul economics
Given the current economic environment, Canada’s hydrogen exports will simply not be economically competitive. Following the first round of H2Global auctions, we have clear evidence of the economic peril of pursuing these projects. That auction awarded a contract for Egyptian green hydrogen at a cost of EUR 811 per tonne of ammonia and an all-in delivered cost of EUR 1,000 per tonne, including logistics and delivery (Ammonia Energy Association 2024).
Consider the case of World Energy GH2’s Project Nujio’qonik. Awarded land grants in 2023, the project planned to consist of several GW of wind turbines, 1.8 GW of electrolysers, and a Haber-Bosch ammonia conversion facility, capable of producing 1.2 million tonnes of green ammonia per year. Available cost estimates hovered around $15 billion (Baxter 2023).
At a product price of EUR 811 per tonne, this facility is financially unviable even with the 40 per cent Hydrogen ITC. Even though Canadian taxpayers would provide as much as $5 billion in subsidies, the project would still manage to destroy nearly $5 billion of investor wealth over the life of the project under a net present value analysis.[1] To break even, the project would need to secure hydrogen offtake at around EUR 1,200 per tonne for its entire life, 50 per cent higher than the price the H2Global auction already fetched.
The Argentia Renewables project from Pattern Energy has also released information on its $1.5 billion project, which it expects to produce 146,000 tonnes of ammonia per year (Pattern Energy 2024). Pattern Energy reportedly signed a letter of intent with German company Mabanaft to purchase its full ammonia output (Cooke 2024). Break-even analysis shows that the project must secure a long-term price of just over EUR 1,000 per tonne of ammonia, a nearly 25 per cent cost premium over the H2Global auction results. For more context, the H2Global auction prices are already around 50 per cent higher than conventional ammonia prices in Germany (IMARC Group 2025).
Developers have begun to realize the treacherous economic path ahead. Before World Energy GH2’s pivot, Fortescue – formerly planning a large ammonia export project in British Columbia – withdrew its project from environmental review in late 2024, stating that “our financial discipline always comes first”(Isaac Phan Nay 2024). Fortescue went on to cancel hydrogen projects in Arizona and Australia in July 2025, writing off US$150 million in engineering and equipment costs and repaying tens of millions of dollars of government funding to shield investors from further losses (Fuel Cell Works 2025).
Conclusion
No matter how they are assessed – whether by their energy requirements, economic feasibility, risk allocation, or decarbonization potential per dollar spent – Canadian hydrogen export projects are something from which sound investors would run.
The notion that such great risks will eventually be justified by large returns to Canada as a first-mover in the European hydrogen export market is fantastical in the extreme.
There will be no such returns for a distant country locking in soon-to-be-antiquated electrolyser technology while facing a 50 to 80 per cent energy penalty compared to regional producers in a bulk commodity market where prices can be expected only to decline. Even this gloomy outlook assumes demand doesn’t first evaporate from a mere change in Germany’s climate policies. The unviability of Canadian projects becomes even more certain when considering that the prices already fetched for green hydrogen in Germany’s H2Global auction are too low to sustain Canadian projects even with the 40 per cent Hydrogen ITC earned by the undercounting of their carbon emissions.
If the Canadian government has taxpayers, businesses, and credible climate action in mind, it will take urgent measures to reduce its risk exposure through these projects. By the analysis above, these projects are bound to fail. All possible offramps from project commitments should be sought; further monetary commitments including loans, grants, or subsidies to projects or other initiatives under the Canada-Germany Hydrogen Alliance should be avoided; repayment of outstanding loans should be accelerated where possible; and in any case the cradle-to-gate carbon counting methodology in the Hydrogen ITC should be adjusted to properly count the unavoidable life-cycle emissions of ammonia exports.
It will not be easy to disentangle Canadian taxpayers from these projects. But when the Canada-Germany Hydrogen Alliance is properly understood for what it is – an arrangement in which Canada pours billions of dollars into financially unviable projects in hopes of serving a noncommittal buyer with better options – doing so becomes a responsibility.
What seemed on its surface to be an innocuous agreement for strategic co-operation has threatened Canada’s credibility in economic and climate strategy. We hope, in three years’ time, the country’s new partnership with Germany on critical minerals will yield a very different conclusion.
About the authors
Dylan Moon is the founder of Nuclear Vision, a multidisciplinary research and communications consultancy specializing in energy policy.
Chris Keefer is the founder and president of Canadians for Nuclear Energy, an advocacy group dedicated to pursuing informed, effective energy policy for the betterment of Canada and the planet.
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[1] Assumptions in the net present value analysis include: 12 per cent average weighted average cost of capital; 30 year project life; operating expenses at a 5 per cent of capital costs; the Canadian corporate tax rate of 25 per cent; 85 per cent project cost coverage of the 40 per cent ITC (excluding site preparation, buildings, transportation infrastructure, etc.); exchange rate of C$1 = EUR 0.645; contracted price of EUR 811 per tonne of ammonia.
