
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- ASEAN governments are attracted to the promise of low-carbon hydrogen, especially green hydrogen, as it offers a potential pathway to net-zero emissions. It can also improve energy security and offers countries with abundant renewable resources an avenue to generate foreign revenue by exporting green hydrogen.
- ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute’s 2024 Southeast Asia Climate Outlook Survey highlights a notable rise in public enthusiasm for green hydrogen year-on-year, particularly among the working-age populations who appear to be attracted to promises of high-value jobs and economic prospects. The national hydrogen strategies presented by governments and media coverage seem to play a significant role in shaping public perceptions.
- Despite the momentum, the prospects for green hydrogen development in the ASEAN region depends on reducing costs, addressing infrastructure and regulatory gaps, aligning global standards, and attracting investments. Furthermore, competition from alternative low-carbon solutions and global hydrogen producers may weaken export prospects and erode government interest.
- Southeast Asian governments need to ensure that their hydrogen strategy complements, rather than dictates, their countries’ broader low-carbon industrial policy. Next, ASEAN member states should place stronger emphasis on regional cooperation to maximise the impact of their national hydrogen efforts.
- Continued public support towards green hydrogen will depend on the ability of policymakers to deliver on their promises. Public enthusiasm may turn negative if the public is forced to pay a high cost for green hydrogen, or when concerns over its safety arises and remains unaddressed. This can lead to community resistance or opposition, potentially resulting in delays or cancellation of hydrogen projects.
ISEAS Perspective 2025/33, 5 May 2025
* Christopher Len is Visiting Senior Fellow and Co-coordinator of the Climate Change for Southeast Asia Programme, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.
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INTRODUCTION
Energy demand in the ASEAN region is increasing due to rapid economic growth, population expansion, rising industrial activity and the shift towards urbanisation.[1] The International Energy Agency notes that based on today’s policy settings, the ASEAN region will account for 25 per cent of global energy demand growth between 2024 and 2035.[2] The region’s economic development is also highly carbon intensive, with GDP and emissions rising in tandem with fossil fuels – led by coal – accounting for nearly 80 per cent of the region’s growing energy demand since 2010.[3] Furthermore, the region has been a net importer of oil since 2005 with net import dependency in 2022 reaching 96 per cent, up from 81 per cent from the year before, making it increasingly vulnerable to fossil fuel price volatility.[4] These trends have significant implications for the region’s carbon emissions, balance of payments and energy security.[5]
In this context, the current global wave of interest in hydrogen as a potential decarbonisation pathway towards net-zero, for its promise to improve energy security, and for its potential to generate export revenue is gathering significant interest in Southeast Asia. While the literature has covered the government, business and techno-economic angles of hydrogen development in the region, the attitudes of the Southeast Asian general population remain underexplored. This knowledge gap is significant as the net-zero energy transition and hydrogen’s potential as a decarbonisation pathway will have direct and significant impacts on societies, communities and livelihoods.
Against the backdrop of the region’s growing interest in low-carbon hydrogen development, this Perspective examines public attitudes towards green hydrogen in Southeast Asia by referencing insights from ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute’s 2024 Southeast Asia Climate Outlook Survey, released in September 2024.[6] It will then highlight the challenges and uncertainties surrounding green hydrogen developments in Southeast Asia and how these factors may influence the evolution of public attitudes towards green hydrogen.
HYDROGEN AS A DECARBONISATION PATHWAY
A key catalyst in generating international interest in low-carbon hydrogen came from the June 2019 International Energy Agency (IEA) report prepared for the G20 event in Japan, which touted hydrogen’s versatility as a substitute for fossil fuels and as complement to electricity in sectors such as transportation, heating, iron and steel production, and power generation.[7] Subsequent reports released soon after by the likes of International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA),[8] the Hydrogen Council,[9] Goldman Sachs[10] and the Energy Transition Commission[11] stoked a new “wave of enthusiasm”[12] towards the creation of a global hydrogen economy.[13]
These reports came at a time when ASEAN was struggling to meet its renewable energy targets to achieve 23 per cent renewable energy share in the total primary energy supply (TPES) target under the ASEAN Plan of Action for Energy Cooperation (APAEC) 2016–2025 Phase II: 2021–2025.[14] Riding on this latest hydrogen wave, the 7th ASEAN Energy Outlook published in September 2022 identified low-carbon hydrogen as one of the key emerging technologies that can help ASEAN member states achieve decarbonisation targets across various sectors.[15] A number of Southeast Asian economies have since taken a special interest in exploring low-carbon hydrogen as a major component in their decarbonisation strategies.
While hydrogen does not release greenhouse gases (GHGs) when used, it can emit CO₂ depending on how it is produced. Colour codes are an informal way to differentiate the production processes.[16] Blue and green hydrogen are cleaner forms, commonly referred to as low-carbon (or “clean”) hydrogen. This contrasts with black, grey, and brown hydrogen produced through fossil fuels which result in CO₂ emissions. Proponents of low-carbon hydrogen argue that it can play a key role in decarbonisation efforts in hard-to-abate sectors such as heavy industry and transportation (shipping and aviation), replace fossil fuel in power generation, and enhance energy security by reducing import reliance.[17]
Blue hydrogen is produced from fossil fuels – typically natural gas – with carbon capture technology. However, production will become more expensive with rising gas prices, undermining energy security benefits.[18] Green hydrogen is produced from water using renewable energy sources through electrolysis, making it the cleanest type of hydrogen. Although it is currently the most expensive and least efficient option, advancements in electrolyser technology are driving down costs, making it a potentially viable decarbonisation solution in the long-term. Green hydrogen is also the most relevant form of hydrogen for the ASEAN region from a production perspective, given Southeast Asia’s abundant renewable energy resource potential.[19]
To date, four countries have unveiled their national hydrogen strategies and roadmaps (hereafter “national hydrogen strategies”), including Singapore (October 2022), Malaysia (October 2023), Indonesia (December 2023) and Vietnam (February 2024). A summary of the key features of these initiatives is presented in Table 1 in the Appendix, and provides a snapshot of the region’s emerging – or at the very least aspirational–hydrogen landscape. While these countries seek to ride on the current global hydrogen wave, the respective national documents reflect their individual circumstances – such as access to natural and financial resources and infrastructure considerations – as well as their governments’ ambition, specific policy priorities and sectoral focus areas. All four emphasise hydrogen’s potential for decarbonisation with a phased approach based on different time horizons. Malaysia, Vietnam and Indonesia with their abundant renewable energy potential have also incorporated export-oriented strategies into their documents.[20]
FINDINGS FROM THE 2024 SOUTHEAST ASIA CLIMATE OUTLOOK SURVEY
Given the growing prominence hydrogen holds as a component of the region’s clean energy aspirations, it is useful to explore what the general population in Southeast Asia thinks about green hydrogen. The net-zero agenda is bringing about structural changes that impact societies, communities and individual livelihoods, with implications for employment and income as the fossil fuel-based industries decline and the green economy develops. One way to gauge the progress of this transition in ASEAN is by examining public sentiments towards the changes taking place.
In the latest Southeast Asia Climate Outlook 2024 Survey, support for green hydrogen increased notably among the 2,931 Southeast Asian respondents across the ten ASEAN countries.[21] We learn about public attitude towards green hydrogen through the survey question: “In your view, which sources of clean energy have the greatest potential in your country (Select your top two choices)?” Respondents were given eight clean energy options namely, solar energy, hydropower, wind energy, green hydrogen, biofuels, geothermal energy, nuclear energy and tidal energy.
As reflected in Chart 1, while solar energy (69 per cent), hydropower (41.8 per cent) and wind energy (31.8 per cent) remained as the top three potential clean energy sources chosen by the respondents, green hydrogen witnessed notable increased support from 8.3 per cent in 2023 to 13.5 per cent in 2024, displacing biofuels (11.8 per cent) from fifth position. Most of the new gains came from top-ranked solar energy where support dropped by 11.1 per cent.
Chart 1. [Breakdown by Energy Type] In your view, which sources of clean energy have the greatest potential in your country (Select your top two choices)?

Source: Sharon Seah, et al., Southeast Asia Climate Outlook: 2024 Survey Report (ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, 2024).
While green hydrogen remains mid-tier in ranking, it can be regarded as the biggest winner in the group. Its ranking is remarkable considering that unlike the more established solar, wind, hydropower and geothermal, green hydrogen remains an emerging low-carbon technological solution that has yet to achieve viable commercial production at-scale globally, let alone Southeast Asia, although several pilot projects, and initiatives are underway in the region, most notably in Malaysia[22] and Indonesia.[23] Chart 2 shows the breakdown by nationality which indicates that Singapore respondents offer the highest support at 31.3 per cent, followed by Malaysia (23.4 per cent) and Brunei (23.3 per cent).
Chart 2. Breakdown by Nationality[24]

Source: Sharon Seah, et al., Southeast Asia Climate Outlook: 2024 Survey Report (ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute, 2024).
Chart 3 provides a year-on-year comparison of support for green hydrogen between 2023 and 2024 at the country level. Here we find a near doubling of support year-on-year in Malaysia (12.7 per cent to 23.4 per cent) and Indonesia (7.8 per cent to 13.7 per cent), while support more than doubled in Vietnam, leaping from 6.5 per cent to 15.3 per cent. This trend can be attributed to the release of national hydrogen strategies by these three countries in 2023 and 2024. Meanwhile, Singapore which released its strategy in October 2022 saw further increases from 26.9 per cent in 2023 to 31.3 per cent in the latest survey.
Chart 3. Breakdown by Nationality with Year-on-Year Comparison

Source: Sharon Seah, et al., Southeast Asia Climate Outlook: 2024 Survey Report (Singapore: ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute, 2024); Sharon Seah, et al., Southeast Asia Climate Outlook: 2023 Survey Report (Singapore: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, 2023).
It is highly likely that the respondents have been influenced by the media coverage of green hydrogen as a low-carbon technological solution. In particular, the release of national hydrogen strategies and the ensuing media coverage where they were released—in Singapore,[25] Malaysia,[26] Vietnam[27] and Indonesia[28]—is likely to have generated positive interest among the public. The ensuing media coverage of national strategies regarding hydrogen’s potential to decarbonise the country, create high value jobs, generate export revenues, enhance energy security, and promote environmental sustainability is likely to have shaped the respondents’ perceptions of its benefits.
Even countries without national hydrogen strategies saw notable increases in public support. Thailand which is preparing its national hydrogen strategy,[29] saw support rising from 5.3 per cent to 9.4 per cent. Two other countries that also showed significant increases are Cambodia (10 per cent to 17.1 per cent) and Laos (3.8 to 8.1 per cent). Similarly, this is likely correlated to media reports on the development of green hydrogen projects in Cambodia[30] and Laos,[31] and given their abundant renewable energy potential.
Chart 4 shows where respondents who selected green hydrogen access their climate change news in 2023 and 2024. In 2024, the top three information sources were mainstream news sources (37.0 per cent), followed by social media (28.3 per cent) and messaging apps (14.7 per cent). There were notable shifts in the way respondents access climate news between 2023 and 2024. Social media which was ranked second in both years, grew from 20.1 per cent to 28.3 per cent, while users of the third ranked messaging apps grew from 5.1 per cent to 14.7 per cent. These shifts came at the expense of mainstream news media which fell from 45.4 per cent to 37 per cent. These findings are general but nonetheless useful indicators for public officials planning their communications and engagement strategies on climate-related issues.
Chart 4. Breakdown by Climate Change News

Source: Sharon Seah, et al., Southeast Asia Climate Outlook: 2024 Survey Report (ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute, 2024); Sharon Seah, et al., Southeast Asia Climate Outlook: 2023 Survey Report (ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, 2023).
Another notable observation is that the majority of respondents who favour green hydrogen are of working age, with a concentration in the 22-35 years (37.2 per cent), 36-45 years (21.3 per cent) and 46-60 years (18.0 per cent) age bracket as shown in Chart 5. The emphasis on value creation for the economy alongside high-quality employment opportunities in the various national strategy and roadmap documents may have resonated strongly with these working adults. Given their governments’ positive assessments and assurances of the strategic role hydrogen has in their future economies, they may harbour expectations for green hydrogen to deliver on these promises.
Chart 5. Breakdown by Age

Source: Sharon Seah, et al., Southeast Asia Climate Outlook: 2024 Survey Report (ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute, 2024).
For instance, Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim touted in the preface of Malaysia’s Hydrogen Economy and Technology Roadmap (HETR) that the country’s hydrogen economy would enable the country to “generate more than RM400 billion in revenue, create more than 200,000 potential job opportunities for the Rakyat while achieving up to 15% GHG emissions reduction.”[32] Likewise, Vietnam’s Ministry of Planning and Investment has noted that “[t]he pure hydrogen ecosystem, which operates on renewable energy sources, is anticipated to generate 40,000-50,000 jobs on the domestic market and contribute between $40-45 billion to annual GDP.”[33]
Singapore’s hydrogen strategy similarly includes a pledge that the government “will work with the industry, unions, and the education sector to support workforce development, to equip Singaporeans with the skills and knowledge needed to thrive in a hydrogen economy should they wish to.[34] Meanwhile, Indonesia is targeting private sector investment in green hydrogen to reach US$24.2 billion (Rp395.58 trillion) by 2060 creating new job opportunities.[35]
CHALLENGES AHEAD
The growing government and public interest in low-carbon hydrogen across Southeast Asia adds a new dimension to the region’s evolving energy landscape, but it is essential to ground this enthusiasm. There is to date no large-scale, commercial green hydrogen project operating in Southeast Asia.
The pace of green hydrogen development in the ASEAN region depends on several international and domestic factors. First, there are techno-economic challenges, including the cost of electrolysers and their reliability. Second, Southeast Asian countries need to develop relevant market mechanisms, domestic legislation, regulatory frameworks and safety protocols, as well as physical infrastructure for the transport and storage of hydrogen. Third, there is the need to harmonise international standards for hydrogen production, cross-border transport and global certification schemes to facilitate the global hydrogen trade. Fourth, substantial investments will be needed to ramp up Southeast Asia’s underdeveloped renewable energy capacity, which is required to support large-scale green hydrogen production, as well as to finance green hydrogen projects.
Fifth, the region’s unique endowments and renewable energy potential suggest that other low-carbon solutions, such as direct electrification via renewable sources, bioenergy, carbon capture and storage may be more viable alternatives in terms of cost and reliability. There is also revived regional interest in nuclear energy based on the latest small modular reactor technologies. These may draw attention and resources away from green hydrogen, especially given the slow progress of the global hydrogen economy, the challenges green hydrogen project developers face in securing offtake agreements, and the competition with data centres for electricity supply.[36] In fact, the IEA noted that the use of hydrogen (and ammonia) in Southeast Asia will remain small in 2050 in both its Stated Policies Scenario (STEPS) and Announced Pledges Scenario (APS), as compared to other renewable and biofuel sources due to cost considerations.[37] In this regard, Southeast Asian governments should ensure that their hydrogen strategy complements, rather than dictates, the country’s broader low-carbon industrial policy.[38]
Finally, Malaysia, Vietnam and Indonesia have announced their aim to become significant exporters of green hydrogen to generate export revenue. However, they face stiff competition from fellow emerging producers in India, Australia and the Middle East. If the export potential of green hydrogen is diminished, Southeast Asian governments may reassess their interest. To compete better, ASEAN member states should place stronger emphasis on regional cooperation to maximise the impact of their national hydrogen efforts.[39]
It is worth noting that there were three earlier “waves of enthusiasm” to scale hydrogen in the 1970s, 1990s and early 2000s in the US, Europe and Japan.[40] The earlier “waves” subsided due to cost realisation, and as policymakers and the public began to comprehend the scale of the challenges in the large-scale adoption of hydrogen; leading to the shift in attention towards other solutions.[41]
Whether the current wave sustains or subsides will depend on the ability of the governments to address the above-mentioned challenges and to deliver, with future public support dependent on visible progress and tangible benefits for the general population. If green hydrogen projects fail to materialise as planned, or if the public is forced to bear a high cost for its use, or if concerns over its safety arise and remain unaddressed, public enthusiasm for green hydrogen is likely to wane. Even worse, public enthusiasm may turn negative, and this can lead to community resistance or opposition, potentially resulting in delays or cancellation of planned hydrogen projects.
APPENDIX
For Table 1: Overview of Hydrogen Strategies and Roadmaps Released in Southeast Asia in the Appendix, please refer to the original pdf document.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
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